Marksmanship and Sniper Doctrine

In college, a lot of my military buddies were Marine and Army types. I never wanted to be an infantry type. I preferred an airplane or a ship. Less mud that way. And bugs. That didn’t mean I didn’t think about infantry strategy and tactics. As a hobby, and with my History Major studies. The late 80’s and early 90’s was all about Manuever Warfare. And we saw it demonstrated in the first Iraq war to great effect. But even success can be improved. Me and my buddies had late night bull sessions long into the night about improving strategy and tactics.

I lighted upon a book about a single Marine named Carlos Hathcock. The infantry guys didn’t seem as interested in it as me. That book and articles about Israeli snipers gave me plenty to draw on in the bull sessions (and it was bull, we were 20 year olds with no real world military experience, just book learning.) My arguments were for a whole platoon or even company size unit of snipers in a Fleet Marine Battalion. A squad can take down the effectiveness of a fire base by shooting at the right place on an artillery piece and vulnerable spots on helicopters on the ground in a minute and then withdraw. It’s a huge force multiplier. And even if you didn’t train that many snipers, shooing 3 round bursts of 5.56 mm ammo wasn’t really hitting anything with bullets two and three, and that the services have dropped the ball on marksmanship since World War II. A rifle firing semi-auto with a .30 caliber round had a value on the battlefield at least with the more elite troops. The infantry guys I was arguing with were all about volume of fire for suppression then flanking an objective. And nothing else. Their counters to my arguments was about the high expense of sniper training being prohibitive in the kind of numbers I was considering. Good marksmanship training would be expensive too, cheaper than sniper school on an individual basis, but with the sheer numbers of recruits contemplated, the cost would be as high. And .30 caliber is heavier, a troop can carry twice as much .223 for suppression work.

Another bull session topic was the unpopularity of the Beretta 9mm. That the gun broke (we were told) too easily and the size round didn’t have the stopping power you’d want on the battlefield. We all mostly agreed on this point, but didn’t have a consensus on any replacement.

We all left school and went out separate ways.

It’s now 2007 and a lot of arguments have actually been implemented! Hmm, whoda thunk it? Am I a genius? No, but I am a lucky guesser that was just picking up the undercurrents and rumblings going on inside the military regarding doctrine.

Sniper schools were growing from before our amateurish bull sessions. There are times when a whole platoon of snipers is available to a Battalion Commander. In the second Iraq war, soldiers on the attack do want a semi-auto .30 gun like the M1A and are carrying them, and engaging the enemy at longer ranges with aimed fire, even without snipers. And there are 2 types of people with sidearms in Iraq, I hear. Those with a .45 ACP and those that want one. Did my Oracle like prophesizing become doctrine? Not quite. In defensive engagements, and meeting engagements, in the dark especially, contact is often very close and volume fire with .223 is wholly desirable. And the military very effectively deploys fire supremacy. Guys that I’ve talked to that have fired both prefer the SAR (.223) over the old M-60 (7.62) for automatic fire, (mainly because the M-60 gives off too much gas when fired) if they are super serious about shooting full auto they want the M2 machine gun (.50 caliber). The M2 is a design older than their grandfathers.

There is talk of a compromise round. 6.5 or 6.8 millimeters or so. More stop than a 5.56 (.223) and lighter to carry and a 7.62 (.308). The military is still testing so I don’t know what the future of that round will be, but changing calibers and the issued infantryman rifle is a BIG DEAL and the decision won’t be taken lightly.